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This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that 
negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of 
incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths 
are analytic according to Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of 
Foundations of Arithmetic, can be held together. Both views are 
attractive in their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist 
mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling 
phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of 
epistemic access to numbers. For an incompatibilist, proofs of 
numerical non-identities must appeal to primitive incompatibilities. 
I argue that no analytic primitive incompatibilities are forthcoming. 
Hence incompatibilists cannot be Fregeans. 
 





1. The Problem of Negation and Negative Truth 
 
Some philosophers find negation problematic. It is not difficult to 
appreciate why. Nothing really corresponds to negation. Nowhere do you 
encounter negativity: you do not perceive that the sky is not green, that 
there is no beer in the fridge, that this Riesling is not dry, that this is box 
does not weigh 5kg. You encounter just what is the case, not also what is 
not the case. What you see is that the sky is blue, you check what is in the 
fridge and there is only a bottle of wine, you taste the sweetness of the 
wine, you weigh the box and the scales’ indicator comes to rest at 3kg. 
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There is only what there is, not also what there is not. So how can we speak 
truly about the world using negative propositions? 
 
The problem of negation or negative truth has been acutely felt by 
empiricists. For words to be meaningful, they have to denote something 
positive, as all that we perceive is positive. Thus the meanings of negative 
expressions must be derivative of and stem from the meanings of positive 
ones, and negative truths must be secondary to and explained in terms of 
positive truths. Hobbes expresses this thought in his Elements of 
Philosophy:  
 
The positive names are prior to the negative ones, because, unless 
the former existed beforehand, there could be no use of the latter. 
(Hobbes 2000, Part 1, Chapter 2, §7) 
 
Locke concurs and writes that  
 
negative or privative words cannot be said properly to belong to, or 
signify no ideas: for then they would be perfectly insignificant 
sounds; but they relate to positive ideas, and signify their absence. 
(Locke 1979: Book III, Chapter 1, §4) 
  
Ayer, grappling with the distinction between negative and affirmative 
statements, concludes that, although negative statements cannot be reduced 
to affirmative ones because the former are less specific than the latter,  
 
logically a negative statement […] can be verified only through the 
truth of some more specific statement which entails it; a statement 
which will itself, by contrast, be counted as affirmative. (Ayer 1952, 
815)  
 
Ayer continues, drawing attention to a metaphysical aspect of his 
conclusion, that  
 
in the same way we can account for the inclination that many people 
have towards saying that reality is positive. The explanation is that 
any information which is provided by a less specific statement will 
always be included in the information provided by some more 
specific statement. (Ibid.) 
  
Ayer describes this inclination quite neutrally, which indicates that, 
although a particularly natural component of the empiricist line of thought, 
the view is attractive also before other metaphysical backgrounds.  
 




One attempt at explaining negative truth or negation in terms of positive 
notions is almost immediately forthcoming. If the sky is blue, then it is not 
green, because being blue excludes it from being green; if the fridge is full 
of wine, its contents exclude bottles of beer from being in it; the sweetness 
of the wine excludes it from being dry; if something weighs only 3kg, this 
excludes it from weighing 5kg. Negation can be explained in terms of what 
things are and what properties exclude each other or which properties are 
incompatible with each other. For ‘a is not F’ to be true, it suffices for a to 
have a property G which is incompatible with F. The puzzle dissolves, 
because negation is not a primitive concept, but one that is explained in 
terms of incompatibility.  
 
Demos offers an extended discussion of the problem of negation and its 
solution in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility in an empiricist 
setting. According to Demos, “a negative proposition constitutes 
description of some true positive proposition in terms of the relation of 
opposition which the latter sustains to some other positive proposition” 
(Demos 1917, 194), where opposition is the notion of incompatibility 
introduced in the last paragraph. More recently, Huw Price has argued in a 
similar spirit that “the apprehension of incompatibility [is] an ability more 
primitive than the use of negation” (Price 1990, 226). Price, like Demos, 
proposes to explain negation in terms of incompatibility:  
 
It is appropriate to deny a proposition P (or assert ~P) when there is 
some proposition Q such that one believes that Q and takes P and Q 
to be incompatible.  (Ibid. 231)  
 
I call the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion 
of metaphysical incompatibility incompatibilism.1 
 
Let’s put some more flesh on incompatibilism. Russell (1951, 297) reports 
that Wittgenstein once refused to accept that there was no hippopotamus 
in a lecture room in Cambridge. Neither is there a hippopotamus in the 
                                                 
1 Price appeals to a further primitive in his explanation of negation, namely a primitive 
speech act of denial. The crucial thought, however, is that negation is based on 
incompatibility. Negation, according to Price (2019, 6), is needed only for pragmatic 
reasons, to enable speakers to register explicitly and to convey to other speaker that they 
consider two propositions to be incompatible. Similarly, Rumfitt (2000) appeals to a notion 
of incompatibility, albeit between speech acts, rather than propositions, in his bilateral 
account of logic. Restall (2005, 6ff), too, appeals to a notion of incoherence, that of 
asserting and denying the same proposition. 
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room I am in now. Cheyne and Pigden explain that the “great big positive 
fact (or collection of facts)” the room as it actually is makes it true that 
there is no hippopotamus in it. Their “claim is that the existence of this fact 
[...] necessitates or makes true the proposition that there is no 
hippopotamus in the room” (Cheyne and Pigden 2006, 255). Had there 
been a hippo in the room, that fact would not have existed. Containing 
intact furniture, books on shelves, an unscathed philosopher etc., is 
incompatible with a room containing a hippo. The things or facts there are 
suffice to explain negative truths. As another example, suppose Theaetetus 
is not flying, but sitting next to Socrates. Then  
 
the big fact (or collection of facts) that we can roughly characterize 
as Theaetetus as he actually is necessitates the truth of [Theaetetus 
is not flying]. For if Theaetetus were flying this fact would not exist. 
Thus positive facts constituting what Theaetetus is doing necessitate 
negative truths about what he is not doing. (Ibid., 259)  
 
Negative truth is explained in terms of the things there are and what they 
exclude or with what they are incompatible. 
 
Veber, too, emphasises that very large, positive, facts, are the truthmakers 
of negative truths.  
If the truth of Q is incompatible with the truth of P then P will entail 
Not-Q and thus P’s truthmaker will function as Not-Q’s truthmaker 
as well. Provided that every negative truth is entailed by some set of 
positive truths with positive truthmakers, negative truths can be 
made true by positive facts. (Veber 2008, 82)  
That neither the Great Wall of China nor a golf ball are in my coffee cup 
is due to certain positive facts. In the first case, “that the cup has certain 
dimensions and that the Wall has certain dimensions are metaphysically 
incompatible with the Wall being contained in the cup” (Veber 2008, 83). 
The dimensions of the cup and the Great Wall of China are positive facts. 
Concerning the golf ball and the cup, “truths about the distribution of air 
(or coffee) molecules inside the cup” and what the golf ball is made of are 
incompatible with the golf ball being in the cup. Golf balls are made of 
“rubber or hard plastic” and that “an air (or coffee) molecule is located in a 
certain place at a certain time is incompatible with a molecule of rubber or 
hard plastic being there” (Veber 2008, 83). Thus, only positive facts and 
what they are incompatible with are needed as the truthmakers of the 
negative truth that there is no golf ball in my coffee cup.  
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The view that negation can be explained in terms of incompatibility is 
interesting, well motivated and attractive. To put it more sharply into focus 
and to illustrate the advantages of the incompatibilist view, let’s compare 
it briefly with the solution that Russell favoured at some point in his 
thinking: that there are negative facts.2  
 
 
3. Against Negative Facts 
 
Russell argued that there are two kinds of facts.  
 
Let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, that x has the relation R 
to y, and z does not have the relation S to w. Each of these facts 
contains only three constituents, a relation and two terms; but the 
two facts do not have the same form. In the one, R relates x and y; in 
the other, S does not relate z and w. It must not be supposed that the 
negative fact contains a constituent corresponding to the word “not.” 
It contains no more constituents than a positive fact of the correlative 
positive form. The difference between the two forms is ultimate and 
irreducible. We will call this characteristic of a form its quality. Thus 
facts, and forms of facts, have two opposite qualities, positive and 
negative. (Russell 1919a, 4)  
 
Russell argued that Demos’ view has no methodological advantage, and in 
fact some disadvantages, over the view that there are negative facts, and 
that it is circular, if the aim is to avoid negative notions, as incompatibility 
is itself negative (Ibid., 5f). 
 
Not many philosophers are satisfied with the view that there are negative 
facts. Even Russell himself was not entirely convinced: in The Philosophy 
of Logical Atomism (Russell 1919b, 42), Russell is less committal and 
merely asks his audience to consider the possibility that there are negative 
facts in addition to positive ones.  
 
Demos aimed to explain negative true propositions without having to 
introduce negative facts. According to Demos,  
 
the reason why such a view must not be entertained is the empirical 
consideration that strictly negative facts are nowhere to be met with 
in experience, and that any knowledge of a negative nature seems to 
be derived from perception of a positive kind. (Demos 1917, 189)  
                                                 




A congenial view is expressed by Grzegorczyk in a paper giving an 
interpretation of intuitionist logic as the logic of scientific research: the 
atomic sentences of the language are established as true or otherwise by a 
method of enquiry, while  
 
the compound sentences are not a product of experiment, they arise 
from reasoning. This concerns also negations: we see that the lemon 
is yellow, we do not see that it is not blue. (Grzegorczyk 1964, 596) 
  
The negations of sentences are not verified directly, but their verification 
involves reasoning.3 
 
Another reason to reject the existence of negative facts is that for each 
positive fact there are uncountably many negative facts. There would be, 
besides the facts of the contents of my room, also the negative facts that 
there is no hippo in it, no rhinoceros, no blackbird, no giraffe, besides the 
facts of its location, there would also be the negative facts that it is not in 
Madrid, not in Paris, not in Berlin, not in Warsaw etc. That is just too many 
facts. It is a demand of ontological economy that if the phenomena can be 
explained without appeal to negative facts, then this is what we should do. 
Arguably, an account such as Cheyne’s and Pigden’s or Veber’s succeeds 
in doing precisely that, and so the existence of negative facts should be 
rejected.  
 
Another reason against accepting negative facts is the following. Suppose 
the cat is on the mat. Then that fact can be said to be located where the cat 
and the mat are. But suppose the cat is not on the mat. Where is the negative 
fact located? Where the cat is? Where the mat is? Where both are? Neither 
answer is particularly attractive. Negative facts do not appear to be located 
anywhere. But something that is not located in space presumably also 
cannot enter the causal nexus of the world. Negative facts would then not 
do any causal work and have no causal effects on the world, and as such, 
on plausible metaphysical assumptions about causality and the physical 
world, they would not be part of it. Negative facts would serve no purpose 
in the world, but they were introduced as supposedly on a par with positive 
facts, which undoubtedly serve a purpose.4 
 
Incompatibilism is a view as general as the problem it aims to solve. The 
problem of negative truth isn’t one exclusively for empiricists. Some 
philosophers may simply share the sentiments Mumford expresses, 
                                                 
3 I owe the reference to Grzegorczyk to a referee for this journal.  
4 For further development of this argument, see Molnar (2000, 76ff). 
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according to whom negative facts, to which negative truths would appear 
to correspond, are  
 
too mysterious to be taken seriously. [‘Everything that exists is 
positive’] has almost a ring of aprioricity about it. How can these 
facts exist and be negative? Indeed, how can any existent really be 
negative? (Mumford 2007, 49)  
 
Mumford's description is, just like Ayer’s quoted earlier, quite neutral, 
which indicates that the problem is not specifically tied to a 
correspondence theory of truth either. Existence itself seems to be 
essentially positive. Nothing negative exists. The problem of negative truth 
is a very ancient and general one. A closely related problem, the problem 
of how there can be false speech or thought, posed itself already to 
Parmenides, who warns us that  
 
never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are, 
but you must hold back your thought from this way of enquiry, nor 
let habit, born of much experience, force you down this way, by 
making you use an aimless eye or an ear and tongue full of 
meaningless sound: judge by reason the strife-encompassed 
refutation spoken by me. (Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1983, 248, 
Fragment 294)  
 
Parmenides concludes: “What is there to be said and thought must needs 
be: for it is there for being, but nothing is not” (Ibid., 247, Fragment 293). 
But then ‘false speech’ or ‘false thoughts’ are meaningless and neither 
speech nor thought at all. The ancient problem of falsity received profound 
systematic treatment and conceptual clarification by Plato. In the middle 
section of the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger is lead to commit “the patricide 
of father Parmenides” and to “insist by brute force both that that which is 
not somehow is, and then again that that which is somehow is not” (Plato 
1997, 241d). In the Euthydemos, Socrates encounters two sophists who 
deny the possibility of false thoughts and disagreement. 5  Plato’s vivid 
presentation of the perplexities surrounding negation, falsity and negative 
truth challenges philosophers of any background to address the problem. 
The issues discussed here apply to a wider range of positions than just some 
                                                 
5 For a commentary on the Euthydemos, see McCabe (forthcoming). I comment on the 




forms of empiricism. For the purposes of illustration, however, I confine 





Reference to and knowledge about numbers is also something many 
philosophers have found problematic, maybe even more so than negation. 
This, too, is a problem that is particularly acute for empiricists, for whom 
reference and knowledge must ultimately be explained in terms of sense 
perception and causal relations between speakers or thinkers and objects 
referred to or known about. We do not experience numbers in sense 
perception and we cannot stand in causal relations to them, as they are 
abstract objects. So how can we refer to them, let alone know anything 
about them? Maybe empiricists are even forced to admit that there are no 
numbers at all, which makes the ubiquity, usefulness and applicability of 
propositions apparently about them even more of a mystery.  
 
Frege, although himself not touched by empiricist worries, formulated an 
attractive starting point for a solution. The logicist view that arithmetical 
truths are analytic opens up prospects for explaining how we manage to 
refer to numbers even though they are abstract objects by explaining 
numerical identities in terms of one-to-one correlations, or even of 
explaining away reference to numbers altogether. According to the 
characterisation of numerical identity that Frege attributes to Hume in 
Foundations of Arithmetic §63, the number of Fs equals the number of Gs 
if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and the 
Gs. Letting # abbreviate ‘the number of’ and ∃! ‘there is exactly one’, what 
is often called Hume's Principle has the following formalisation:  
#xFx = #xGx ≡  ∃R (∀x(Fx → ∃!y(Gy & Rxy)) & ∀y(Gy → ∃!x(Fx & Rxy))) 
 
                                                 
6 There are of course also empirically minded philosophers who have no problem with 
negation. I have already mentioned Russell. Aristotle, too, has no qualms about appealing 
to negation in the formulation of the most certain and fundamental principle in Metaphysics 
𝛤.3, that “the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same 
subject in the same respect” (Aristotle 1985, 1005ba19-20). Mill also belongs to this group: 
“When the positive name is connotative, the corresponding negative name is connotative 
likewise; but in a peculiar way, connoting not the presence but the absence of an attribute. 
Thus, not-white denotes all things whatever except white things; and connotes the attribute 
of not possessing whiteness. For the non-possession of any given attribute is also an 
attribute, and may receive a name as such; and thus negative concrete names may obtain 
negative abstract names to correspond to them” (Mill 1882, 41f). For opposition to the 
incompatibilist account of negation, see Armstrong (2004, 55ff), Kürbis (2019, Ch. 4), 
Molnar (2000), Taylor (1952, 1953). The last paper is a response to a paper of Ayer's on 
negation quoted earlier. For a commentary on Molnar’s paper, see Kürbis (2018).  
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For ease of exposition, we can additionally require that ∀x∀y(Rxy → Fx & 
Gy), so that R is a relation the domain of which are the Fs and the range of 
which are the Gs.  
 
Russell’s version of logicism was sympathetic to empiricism. Carnap 
explicitly thought that logicism provides an approach to solving the 
problem of reference to numbers in an empiricist setting. Carnap describes 
how he  
 
had learned from Frege that all mathematical concepts can be 
defined on the basis of the concepts of logic and that the theorems 
of mathematics can be deduced from the principles of logic. Thus 
the truths of mathematics are analytic in the general sense of truth 
based on logic alone. [...] It became possible for the first time to 
combine the basic tenet of empiricism with a satisfactory 
explanation of the nature of logic and mathematics. (Carnap 1963, 
46f) 
 
Hale and Wright developed Frege’s thoughts in a direction which, although 
they themselves may not be motivated purely by empiricist worries either, 
can plausibly be appropriated by empiricists. Their aim is to explain 
  
how statements of a given kind can be understood as involving 
reference to abstract objects and can yet remain, at least in principle, 
humanly knowable, given that the objects they concern are outside 
space and time and in consequence can stand in no sort of 
epistemologically relevant, causal relations to human knowers. [...] 
A statement of numerical identity---in the fundamental case, a 
statement of the kind: the number of Fs = the number of Gs---is true, 
if true, in virtue of the very same state of affairs which ensures the 
truth of the matching statement of one-to-one correspondence 
among concepts, and may be known a priori if the latter may be so 
known. (Hale and Wright 2002, 118f)  
 
Despite Frege’s own nonchalance regarding epistemological concerns, 
logicism provides philosophers reluctant to posit a special faculty of the 
mind to account solely for our capacity of reference to and knowledge 
about numbers, be it Kantian or Gödelian intuition, with an attractive 
account of how we, as physical beings situated in space and time, 
nonetheless manage to have epistemic access to numbers.  
 
In Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege also provided appealing definitions of 




It is necessary to find a proof [of a proposition] and to follow it down 
to the primitive truths. If in that process all that is met with are the 
general logical laws and definitions, then the truth is analytic [...] If, 
however, it is not possible to give a proof without appealing to truths 
which are not of the general logical kind, but are related to a special 
field of knowledge, then the sentence is synthetic. For a truth to be 
a posteriori we require that its proof cannot proceed without 
appealing to facts, i.e. to unprovable truths without generality that 
contain statements about specific objects. If, on the other hand, it is 
possible to give a proof from purely general laws that can neither be 
proved nor stand in need of proof, then the truth is a priori. (Frege 
1990, §3)  
 
For want of a better term, I shall call the view that arithmetical truths are 
analytic in Frege's sense Fregeanism. The terminology is not supposed to 
suggest that Fregeanism incorporates all of Frege’s philosophy. It is only a 
thesis on the nature of mathematical truths and the definitions of a priori, 
a posteriori, synthetic and analytic. In my terminology, Frege is of course 
a Fregean, but Fregeans need not accept all of Frege’s views. The most 
promising way of spelling out Fregeanism is to count Hume’s Principle as 
analytic, but philosophers who accept Hume’s Principle as analytic need 
not be Fregeans in my terminology, if they do not accept Frege’s definition 
of analyticity.  
 
Fregeanism is independent of empiricism. However, as Carnap’s position 
or an empiricist Neo-Fregeanism are well motivated, for the purposes of 
this essay I am interested in an empirically minded Fregean. I do not 
require my empiricist to reject the existence of abstract objects outright, 
but only that he does not accept their existence lightly: a philosopher who 
demands a strong argument, ideally a proof, before accepting the existence 
of a particular kind of abstract object, and hence who does not just accept 
that there are numbers, but demands that this must be established. 
 
 
5. Incompatibilist Fregeanism 
 
Fregeanism and incompatibilism deserve and have received serious 
consideration. They are initially plausible and provide promising ways of 
accounting for philosophically puzzling phenomena, especially in a 
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broadly empiricist setting. Some philosophers may wish to accept both 
views. I will argue that, attractive though it is, this position is problematic.7 
 
Consider ‘a is red and green all over’. By Frege's definition, it is neither 
synthetic nor analytic, neither a priori nor a posteriori, as it is not true: 
being red is incompatible with being green all over. Only true propositions 
are classified by Frege’s definition: false propositions do not have proofs, 
and to classify a proposition, it is necessary to find a proof of it, says Frege. 
That is slightly unusual, but it is merely a slightly unusual use of 
terminology. We can amend the definition by stipulating that false 
propositions belong to the same categories as their negations.  
 
The axioms of logic are a priori. Axioms of logic are propositions which 
can neither be proved nor do they stand in need of proof (from something 
else), while at the same time they are proved from purely general laws: 
they are their own one-step proofs. The same can be said of 'Being red is 
incompatible with being green all over'. It is a primitive, general law 
expressing a truth that anyone who has mastered the concepts ‘red’ and 
‘green’ is in a position to recognise. Thus it is a priori. But its (one-step) 
proof is related to a special field of knowledge, namely colours, so it is 
synthetic.8 Arguing indirectly, ‘Being red is incompatible with being green 
all over’ cannot be anything but synthetic a priori. It is not a posteriori, as 
it does not contain reference to specific objects. It does not follow from 
                                                 
7 My aim is to map out logical space and assess the general prospects for combining two 
views, while avoiding the details of how any particular philosopher might combine them. 
The possibility of combining incompatibilism and Fregeanism has not attracted much 
attention in the literature. However, Neil Tennant accepts both, logicism and 
incompatibilism (see Tennant 1987, 1999, 2009). Various members of audiences to whom 
I presented this paper have expressed sympathy for the combination. I'll say a few words 
about Tennant in a later footnote. Although Tennant’s approach is attractive and elegant, 
discussing it in more detail here would distract from what is at issue. His explanations of 
concepts of arithmetic may strike some readers as problematic for reasons independent of 
my concerns in this paper, as he appears to define the concept ‘the number of’ and ‘0’ at 
the same time. 
8 This is plausible independently of Frege’s definitions. Maybe most people who accept 
that there are synthetic a priori truths agree that “Being red is incompatible with being 
green all over” is an example. On a Kantian definition, it is synthetic, because is 
incompatible with being green all over is “outside the concept” being red and it “add[s] to 
the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and 
which no analysis could possibly extract from it” (Kant 2010, A 7/B 11). Having grasped 
the concepts red, green and incompatible suffices to grasp that being red is incompatible 
with being green. It is something that “our faculty of knowledge supplies from itself”, hence 
it is a priori. Besides, “Being red is incompatible with being green all over” carries with it 
a kind of necessity that, according to Kant, a posteriori knowledge cannot have. 
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only general logical laws and definitions, so it is not analytic. Assuming 
every truth can be classified by Frege’s definitions, it is synthetic a priori. 
 
If establishing the incompatibility of F and G appeals to a special field of 
knowledge concerning the properties F and G, then ‘Being F is 
incompatible with being G’ is synthetic a priori. Frege’s definitions assume 
that if there is a proof of a proposition, there is one in which every step is 
made explicit according to the axioms of the system and the additional 
assumptions necessary to derive the proposition. If negation is defined in 
terms of incompatibility, any such fully analysed proof of a proposition ~A 
must appeal to propositions about incompatibilities. If these propositions 
are synthetic, ~A itself is synthetic.  
 
A Fregean can employ an axiomatisation of logic in which negation is 
primitive. The incompatibilist needs to adopt one in which incompatibility 
is primitive. Proofs in second-order logic plus Hume’s Principle remain 
valid for the incompatibilist Fregean, but they require analysis into more 
basic steps where any appeal to negation is replaced by an appeal to 
incompatibility. As by the Fregean definition fully analysed proofs are 
decisive for establishing whether a proposition is analytic or synthetic, a 
priori or a posteriori, although arithmetical propositions certainly remain 
a priori, because the newly analysed proofs will only appeal to purely 
general laws that can neither be proved nor stand in need of proof, to ensure 
that they remain analytic, the incompatibilist Fregean needs to avoid 
appeal to propositions that refer to a specific field of knowledge. 
Incompatibilism is motivated by examples such as ‘Being red is 
incompatible with being green’, which involve properties of physical 
objects. These would not do for arithmetic, as arithmetic is not tied to the 
existence of colours. An incompatibilist could extend the account of 
negation to arithmetic by appealing to primitive incompatibilities 
involving the numbers, such as ‘Being identical to 1 is incompatible with 
being identical to 2’. However, these appeal to a special field of knowledge, 
namely the numbers, and thus any proposition proved by appeal to them 
would be synthetic. Thus this route is not open to the Fregean 
incompatibilist. The fundamental idea of Frege’s logicism was that names 
referring to numbers are not primitive, but defined in purely logical terms. 
In other words, the Fregean incompatibilist must assume that there are 
propositions of the form ‘Being F is incompatible with being G’ which are 
analytic, i.e. that there are purely logical properties that are incompatible 
with each other.  
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6. Are there Analytic Incompatibilities? 
 
As numerical identities are explained in terms of Hume’s Principle, we 
might expect numerical non-identities to be provable on the basis of 
incompatibilities involving one-to-one mappings. Let’s consider an 
example of the kind Frege uses to motivate his account. Suppose you’re 
laying the table. You map the knives and forks one-to-one onto each other 
and attempt to map them one-to-one onto the plates. You fail and one plate 
is left over. You have discovered that the forks and knives are 
equinumerous, but that the plates are not equinumerous to them. Trying to 
express the non-identity ‘The number of plates is not identical to the 
number of knives’ in terms only of what things are and incompatibility, we 
could say that being that left over plate is incompatible with being mapped 
onto a knife and fork. Generalising, attempting to map Fs and Gs one-to-
one onto each other leads sometimes to success, sometimes to frustration. 
If the number of Fs is not identical to the number of Gs, attempting to map 
the Fs one-to-one onto the Gs will always leave some Gs or Fs out.  
 
Arithmetic cannot be based on an activity of mapping, anymore than it can 
be based on the activity of laying the table. If we appeal to a mental faculty 
of carrying out such mappings or mathematical constructions in the 
abstract, it looks as if we once more appeal to a special field of knowledge, 
so that propositions about incompatibilities between sizes of sets turn out 
to be synthetic. The incompatibilist Fregean should follow a similar path 
to Frege’s and use the example as purely heuristic to motivate a general 
account suitable for the foundations of arithmetic. Following this line of 
thought, the incompatibilist Fregean needs to specify purely logical 
primitive incompatibilities between sizes of sets that can be appealed to in 
establishing numerical non-identities.  
 
Let’s assume that there are more Gs than Fs. Then for any one-to-one 
relation R with the Fs as domain, for every F, there is exactly one G such 
that R relates them, but there are some Gs which are not identical to any of 
those that are related by R to an F. The incompatibilist Fregean needs a 
general characterisation of one-to-one relations that map the Fs into but 
not onto the Gs in terms of incompatibility and without using negation. It 
must apply to all cases in which there is no one-to-one relation between Fs 
and Gs. Only then can we expect to be able to prove that such 
incompatibilities hold, independently of being able to carry out certain 
constructions or not. It is not enough to say that assuming there to be a one-
to-one correlation entails two incompatible statements: what these might 
be is precisely the question we are trying to answer. The incompatibilities 
we are looking for need to be general, so we cannot rely on some 
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characterisation involving the particular natures of the Fs and the Gs. It 
would be too general to lay down that ‘Being one of the Fs is incompatible 
with being one of the Gs’, which is true if there are as many green as there 
are red things. We might try the following: If for any relation R, R's being 
a one-to-one mapping onto the Fs is incompatible with R’s being a one-to-
one mapping onto the Gs, we can conclude that there is no one-to-one 
mapping of the Fs onto the Gs and that the number of Fs is not identical to 
the number of Gs. This, though, is not an incompatibility that can simply 
be appealed to in a proof: it is itself the kind of thing that stands in need of 
proof.  
 
Let’s go back to the heuristic point that some Gs are ‘left over’ by any one-
to-one mapping R of the Fs into the Gs. Being one of those Gs is 
incompatible with R mapping an F to it. This isn’t good enough, as we 
cannot always indicate the Gs, but it shows that we need to draw a general 
distinction between two kinds of Gs: between those such that R maps some 
F to them and the others. The problem the incompatibilist faces is that they 
cannot use negation, as we normally would, to draw general distinctions. 
The most obvious differentiation between the two kinds of Gs is that one 
kind of G is such that R relates an F to them, while the other Gs are not of 
that kind, but that makes use of negation. We might try the following: being 
one of the Gs to which R relates an F is incompatible with being one of the 
other Gs. But that still requires a specification of a way of establishing the 
otherness of those Gs, and besides, what could ‘being other’ mean other 
than ‘not being identical to any of those’. As a final attempt, for any one-
to-one relation R, there is a G such that being the value of R for an F is 
incompatible with being it. But even waiving worries about what ‘being 
incompatible with being it’ might mean, the problem remains of how to 
establish in general that this is the case for a given G.9 
 
To solve these difficulties, the incompatibilist Fregean might introduce a 
further notion: difference. We can then say there are some Gs which are 
different from those Gs such that R relates an F to them. Doing so is of 
course to admit that incompatibility alone is insufficient, as a further 
                                                 
9 Tennant’s system suffers from exactly this problem: his account of the “badness” of ⊥ 
ties it firmly to “various ways that we understand the world simply cannot be” (Tennant 
1999, 217), which are synthetic truths. No attempt is made to specify any analytic 
absurdities. In his formalisation of arithmetic, he helps himself to ⊥ in the rules for 0 and 
for one-to-one relations into, but not onto (Tennant 1987, 277ff, cf. also Tennant 2009). 
The rules are of course formulated generally, but this generality does not get us any further, 
if it only ranges over the examples of incompatibilities given by Tennant, which are 
synthetic a priori. 
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primitive is needed for a satisfactory theory. More importantly, however, 
there is a crucial difference between difference and incompatibility. We 
have introduced ‘difference’ merely to avoid using ‘not’: it has no further 
content than ‘not identical’. By contrast, incompatibility is a rich and 
interesting notion: there is an attempt at giving it content independently of 
our interest in negation. The metaphysics of colours gives rise to some of 
them being incompatible with each other. Other properties exhibit a similar 
phenomenon. Difference, on the other hand, appears to have no other 
content than non-identity and as an additional primitive it is just ‘not 
identical’ rewritten into one word. The move of adding a primitive notion 
of difference is rather desperate. It is either ad hoc or a thinly veiled appeal 
to negation.10 
 
Contrary to expectation, one-to-one correspondences are not a promising 
source of analytic incompatibilities. But maybe there are others. Frege 
accepted that there are two logical objects, the True and the False, so that 
T = F is a logical falsehood. However, such an approach is not congenial 
to an incompatibilist: if there are such objects, we might as well define 
negation in terms of them rather than incompatibility. It may be that an 
incompatibilist can accept the existence of these two logical objects, but 
then the burden of proof is clearly on the incompatibilist to provide such 
an account and establish its superiority over an account that begins with 
truth and falsity.  
 
There is a more general point here. The use of classical truth tables is not 
congenial to the incompatibilist account. Classical truth tables appeal to 
independently given notions of truth and falsity. ‘A’ is false if and only if 
‘~A’ is true, hence anyone finding negation problematic will find falsity 
problematic, too. The incompatibilist aims to explain negation in terms of 
incompatibility: ~A is true if and only if there is some true proposition 
incompatible with A. The same explanation will work for falsity, using the 
former equivalence. So on the incompatibilist account, falsity is to be 
explained, just like negation, in terms of incompatibility. Besides, Price 
observes that giving the meaning of negation in terms of its truth table also 
depends on a primitive notion of incompatibility, as it “clearly depends on 
                                                 
10 One might even go further, as suggested by a referee, and observe that the statement that 
R is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs involves an implicit appeal to 
negation: R maps different Fs to different Gs, and to say that x and y are different is to say 
that x and y are not identical, which appeals to negation. Thus right from the start, a logicism 
building on Hume’s Principle is incompatible with incompatibilism. However, an 
incompatibilist like Tennant would deny that the concept of one-to-one correspondence 
implicitly appeals to negation, as negation is not appealed to in Tennant’s rules for one-to-
one correspondence: those rules are entirely positive. 
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our knowing that truth and falsity are incompatible” (Price 1990, 226). 
Nonetheless, incompatibilism is not biased against classical logic. The 
references to Grzegorczyk and Tennant in the current paper may suggest 
that an incompatibilist view is more congenial to intuitionist, rather than 
classical, negation. There are, however, also incompatibilists who have no 
qualms about accepting classical logic. Price is one of them. Demos, 
Cheyne, Pigden and Veber express no hesitations about classical logic. 
Peacocke (1987, 163f) argues that his explication of the meaning of 
negation in terms of primitive incompatibility validates double negation. 
Brandom (2008, 126f) is a further example of a classicist incompatibilist.  
 
According to an influential generalised treatment of negation discussed by 
Dunn, the negations of propositions are evaluated in terms of a primitive 
incompatibility relation ⊥ between states, situations or possible worlds:  
 
𝜒 ⊨ ~p if and only if  ∀𝛼(𝛼 ⊨ p implies 𝛼 ⊥ 𝜒) 
 
Intuitively, “⊥ is to be thought of as a kind of incompatibility relation, i.e., 
𝛼 ⊥ 𝜒 means that 𝛼 asserts something which 𝜒 denies” (Dunn 1993, 332). 
One might try to appropriate this explanation to the present case to search 
for analytic incompatibilities, and say that 𝛼 ⊥ 𝜒 holds in case 𝛼 and 𝜒 
contain propositions that are metaphysically incompatible. This, however, 
this still leaves the crucial question unanswered. ~p will only count as 
analytically true at a world 𝜒 if the incompatibility relation amongst worlds 
may hold as a matter of analytically incompatible propositions being 
asserted at each world. So unless analytic incompatibilities are 
forthcoming independently of the definition of when the negation of a 
proposition is true at a world, so that we can say that there are cases where 
𝛼 asserts a proposition that is analytically incompatible with a proposition 
that 𝜒 asserts, the definition is not going to produce analytically true 
negations.11 
 
Another option for an analytic incompatibility might be ‘Everything is 
identical to everything’. For Frege, at least, this is a logical falsehood that 
can be formulated without using negation. It is false because there are at 
least two objects, the True and the False. Even better, Hume’s Principle 
entails that there are infinitely many objects. But this is not a suitable 
answer for an incompatibilist Fregean. The reason why ‘Everything is 
identical to everything’ is logically false is that there are at least two 
different objects. Hume’s Principle only entails the existence of infinitely 
                                                 
11 The discussion of Dunn was added in response to a request by a referee. 
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many objects if we have a means of expressing that there are different 
objects, and the proof appeals to negation in the definition of 0 as the 
number of things equinumerous to the non-self-identical ones. Even if we 
contrived a new concept 'being incompatible with being itself', this still 
leaves the question of how to secure that being equinumerous to the objects 
falling under that concept is not equinumerous to the number of things 
falling under the concept ‘identical to 0’.12 As argued, adding a primitive 
notion of difference to secure this is unconvincing. 
 
As a final attempt, one might observe that in second order logic it is 
possible to express logical falsehoods without using negation, as the falsum 
constant ⊥ is definable as ∀p . p, and that it is possible to prove that there 
are at least two different concepts or properties, one under which 
everything falls and one under which nothing false, so that ‘All concepts 
are identical’ or ‘All properties are identical’ can serve as an analytic 
falsehood that does not appeal to negation. The crux here, however, as 
before, lies with ‘different’. ‘All concepts are identical’ or ‘All properties 
are identical’ is absurd only if there are two different concepts or properties, 
that is to say, two concepts or properties that are not identical. Besides, to 
say that there is a concept under which nothing falls blatantly appeals to 
negation. That all propositions are true is also absurd only if there are at 
least two different propositions, one true and one false, or one incompatible 
with the other.13 The former may be true as a matter of logic, but it relies 
on the notion of difference, hence negation, and besides, it appeals once 
more to independently given notions of truth and falsity, which, as argued, 
is no good for the incompatibilist Fregean. The latter option just reiterates 
the problem: those two incompatible propositions would have to be 
analytically incompatible to be of use to the incompatibilist Fregean, and 





No analytic incompatibilities are forthcoming. The conclusion suggests 
itself that the only propositions that are analytically incompatible are 
analytic propositions and their negations. 14 But this is no good for the 
incompatibilist Fregean, who aims to define negation in terms of 
                                                 
12 Cook and Cogburn (2000, 10f) make a related point that defining ~A as A → 0=1 is not 
sufficient, as there are acceptable intuitionist theories that verify the Peano Axioms, but 
also 0=1. 
13 For further discussion of an attempt to define negation in terms of ⊥, see Kürbis (2015).  
14 As observed by a referee.  
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incompatibility and is in need of analytic incompatibilities for the 
foundations of mathematics. So it looks very much as if incompatibilism 
is incompatible with Fregeanism.  
 
I conclude that Fregean incompatibilism, if not incoherent, has tricky 
questions to answer. The burden of proof is certainly on the Fregean 
incompatibilist to make the case that the position is tenable. Of course, it 
would be possible to adopt different definitions of ‘analytic’ and 
‘synthetic’. But that would not change the fact that much of arithmetic on 
an incompatibilist account would turn out to be synthetic according to 
Frege’s definition. And hasn’t Frege himself given good reasons against 
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